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Endogenous Technical Progress and Spillovers in a  
Vertically-Linked Model of Economic Geography 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Technology has generated vast economic surpluses, but has also driven extreme and growing 
economic inequality due to the self-reinforcing nature of technical progress and technology 
diffusion. Economists have recently renewed their interest in the important role of geography in 
the creation and diffusion of technology – and hence in economic development and inequality. 
This paper contributes to this effort by introducing a simple endogenous growth process in which 
labor productivity increases with industry size and spillovers between regions are possible into a 
core-periphery vertically-linked model(1996). Rather than isolating their effect, this paper 
studies the implications of adding endogenous growth and spillovers to the existing vertical 
linkages of the Puga and Venables (1996) model. Multiple equilibria may obtain when 
endogenous growth with spillovers is added. While endogenous technical progress is generally 
an agglomeration forced and spillovers are a dispersion force, the strength of these forces is 
mediated by trade costs. Finally, the dispersion forces associated with increasing spillovers and 
relatively low, falling trade costs mostly operate independently, but there are critical values of 
trade costs at which the two are strong ‘dispersion complements’ such that a marginal increase in 
spillover scope significantly reduces the economic inequality between the two regions. The 
existence of such tipping points suggests that some countries attempting to increase technology 
spillovers into its economy may enjoy few development benefits while others may reap 
substantial gains.  
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I. Introduction 
In the global economy, technology inequality is very apparent, at times extreme, and seems to be 
growing. Today’s technology disparities trace their origins most directly to the Industrial 
Revolution (1780-1860), which emanated from Great Britain and marked the beginning of an age 
of increasing temporal and spatial technological inequality. The effects of this prosperity wedge 
between nations persist due to the self-reinforcing nature of technical progress. Consequently, 
inequalities of income across the globe today, while extreme, may actually be exceeded by 
inequalities of scientific output and technical innovation(Sachs 1999). Furthermore, technology 
flows between technically disparate regions are far from frictionless.1 While expected 
profitability of a new technology largely determines its rate of diffusion (Griliches 1957), the 
local diffusion of profitable technologies from firm-to-firm can take up to 50 years (Rosenberg 
1982). Recently, Keller (2002)has (2002)examined this link more explicitly, concluding that the 
geographic half-life of technology, the distance at which only half of the technology stock at the 
origin remains, is about 1,200 km. Geography, it seems, plays a lead role in the creation and 
diffusion of technology.  
While early economists recognized that economic development hinges importantly on 
technical progress, the advent of endogenous growth modeling techniques allowed for more 
rigorous analysis of the interaction between innovation and development (Grossman and 
Helpman 1991, Romer 1990). More recently, the emerging ‘new economic geography’ has 
brought new modeling approaches to bear on the location decisions made by economic agents 
(Krugman 1991, Krugman and Venables 1995). The intersection of endogenous growth and new 
economic geography was quickly recognized as a fruitful ground from which insights into the 
process of technology creation, the spread of industry between countries and economic 
development could spring (Baldwin and Forslid 2000, Martin and Ottaviano 2001). This paper 
contributes to this effort by introducing into a two-region economic geography model in the 
spirit of Puga and Venables (1996) a simple endogenous growth process in which labor 
productivity increases with industry size and spillovers between regions are possible. Rather than 
                                               
1 New ideas are mostly recombinations of old ones and, while nonrival in nature, are generally at least partly 
excludable thanks to legal and social institutions such as trade secrets and intellectual property. Thus innovation 
typically shows increasing returns to scale (Romer 1990) and technology stocks are thus less likely than capital 
stocks to converge across national borders (Sachs 2000). There are also potential environmental, societal, 
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isolating their effect, this paper studies the implications of adding endogenous growth and 
spillovers to the existing vertical linkages of the Puga and Venables (1996) model. How do the 
dispersion forces associated with spillovers and falling trade costs jointly affect the spread of 
industry from one region to the other? Are falling trade costs and increasing spillovers dispersion 
substitutes or complements? 
Section II reviews the new economic geography and discusses previous efforts to 
combine these models with endogenous growth. Section III contains the derivation of the basic 
model, then presents a specification of endogenous technical progress. Section IV presents 
results from the analysis. Section V discusses possibilities for future research and concludes.  
 
II. Technical Progress and Development in Economic Geography  
The basic ‘new economic geography’ story, summarized succinctly in recent surveys on the topic 
(see Baldwin, et al. 2003, Neary 2001, Schmutzler 1999), goes as follows. Increasing returns to 
scale make geographical concentration of the production of each good profitable. When 
transportation costs are added, these agglomeration forces are magnified as producers seek to 
locate close to their suppliers (input markets) and their consumers (output markets). This 
concentration is self-reinforcing in that it attracts mobile factors of production to the producers' 
increasingly concentrated location, thus building a local output market. These forces are 'second-
nature' since they are a function not of natural endowments, but of the existence of consumers 
and other firms. Dispersion forces, which repel economic agents from concentrated locations, 
typically arise from input and output prices being driven up in response to increasing local 
competition for resources.  
Fujita, Krugman and Venables (Fujita, et al. 1999) (henceforth FKV) synthesize the 
founding new economic geography research (Krugman 1991, Krugman and Venables 1995, 
Puga and Venables 1996) and suggest a useful approach to modeling geographic agglomeration. 
Following Krugman and Venables (1995) and Puga and Venables (1996), FKV present in 
chapter 15 a model of economic development in which firms are vertically-linked through 
intermediate goods.2 With this Core-Periphery Vertically-Linked (CPVL) model,3 they posit a 
                                                                                                                                                       
institutional, economic, and political pitfalls to the process of technology transfer (David 1975, North 1991, 
Rosenberg 1982, Sagasti, et al. 1994). 
2 The driving element in new economic geography models is either vertical linkages, as in this paper, or 
interregional factor mobility. Note that the model presented in FKV chapter 15 is identical in spirit to the Puga and 
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simple exogenous growth process, constant across sectors and countries, as primarily driving 
economic change and the spatial expansion of manufacturing industry. The growth process is 
exogenous because they “are concerned with the spatial implications of growth, and not with its 
origins” (Fujita, et al. 1999, p.264). Purposely beginning with no inherent differences between 
countries, the CPVL model highlights that "industrialization in the world economy occurs via a 
series of dramatic developmental spurts, with a few countries at any given time experiencing 
surging production and wages while others are for the time being left on the sidelines" (Fujita, et 
al. 1999, p.277). These rather complex results are driven by the forward and backward linkages 
built into the model via intermediate goods in the production technology.  
Economic geography models developed subsequently have linked industrialization with 
endogenous growth. This stream of research, summarized nicely in Baldwin et al. (2003, p.186-
8), highlights the importance of technological spillovers and spillover scope.4 Martin and 
Ottaviano (1999) extend the CPVL model to allow endogenous growth with either global and 
local spillovers. They show that even if spillovers are local and industry remains concentrated in 
one region both regions may benefit from industrial concentration, relative to the symmetric 
outcome, if the rate of innovation is sufficiently high. Baldwin and Forslid (2000) introduce 
endogenous growth with spillovers ranging continuously from local to global into a core-
periphery model without vertical linkages and conclude that while endogenous growth is an 
agglomeration force, spillovers are a dispersion force. Martin and Ottaviano (2001) isolate the 
effect of endogenous growth and show growth can be an agglomeration force independent of 
interlocational factor mobility or intrasectoral vertical linkages.  
The model developed in this paper, like Martin and Ottaviano (1999), extends the CPVL 
model to include endogenous technical change. A simple endogenous growth process is 
introduced by allowing labor productivity to grow with (manufacturing) industry size. Unlike 
Martin and Ottaviano (1999), the growth specification allows spillovers to vary continuously 
                                                                                                                                                       
Venables (1996) model. In developing the model in this paper, I chose to follow the model contained in FKV 
chapter 15, while recognizing that the original version of the model is contained in Puga and Venables (1996).  
3 This helpful taxonomy is borrowed from Baldwin et al. (2003). 
4 Spillovers are local when positive productive externalities (e.g., knowledge/information leaks) are contained within 
regions. Spillovers are global when these externalities benefit both regions equally, regardless of their origin. 
Spillovers are conceptually distinct from technology transfer—spillovers are incidental and organic whereas 
technology transfer is deliberate and structured—but in the abstract both represent an inter-regional productivity 
linkage and are thus indistinguishable. Throughout this paper I use the term ‘spillovers,’ while recognizing that 
given the formulation of the model ‘technology transfer’ is an equally-valid interpretation of the inter-regional 
productivity linkage. 
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from local to global. Rather than isolating the effect of endogenous growth as in Martin and 
Ottaviano (2001), this paper studies the implications of adding endogenous growth with 
spillovers to the existing forces of the CPVL model. Ultimately, the paper evaluates how the 
dispersion forces associated with spillovers and falling trade costs jointly affect the spread of 
industry from one region to the other. Instead of focusing explicitly on the stability of the 
symmetric equilibrium, this paper assesses the impact of endogenous technical change on the 
spread of industry and real wage inequality in the spirit of Puga and Venables (1996) and FKV 
(1999, chapter 15).  
 
III. An Economic Geography Model with Endogenous Growth 
This section’s presentation of the CPVL economic geography model follows FKV (1999), but 
also borrows from the excellent description of the model in Baldwin et al. (2003, chapter 8). The 
emphasis herein is on the key elements of the CPVL model, and readers interested in greater 
detail are referred to FKV (1999). After describing the model, I propose, discuss and incorporate 
a functional specification of endogenous technical change in which labor productivity increases 
with manufacturing industry size. The endogenous growth function is specified to facilitate 
interpretation and to fit into the CPVL model with minimal modification.  
The CPVL model assumes there are two identical regions, 1 and 2, and two sectors, a 
perfectly competitive agricultural sector (A) producing a single homogeneous good, and an 
imperfectly competitive manufacturing sector (M) producing a large variety of differentiated 
goods along a continuous product space. Competition in the M sector is modeled as Dixit-Stiglitz 
monopolistic competition (Dixit and Stiglitz 1977). Goods from the A sector are traded 
costlessly, as are M goods traded locally (i.e., intra-regionally). To trade one unit of M inter-
regionally, however, an M firm must ship T>1 units (i.e., iceburg trade costs). Labor is mobile 
within, but not between, regions so that equilibrium wage rates for sectors A and M are equalized 
within, but not necessarily between, each region. 
Consumers have two-tiered preferences over A and M. The upper tier consists quasi-
homothetic preferences specified as a linear expenditure system in which a subsistence quantity 
of A, denoted Y , must be consumed before any M goods. The lower tier consists of a Constant 
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Elasticity of Substitution (CES) aggregation of each variety of manufactured good available. 
Formally,  
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where 㯀 is the expenditure share of M goods (0>㯀>1), mj represents the consumption of each 
variety available, n is the range of varieties produced, and 㰰 is the elasticity of substitution 
between varieties (㰰>1).5 The subsistence requirement ensures that consumers' demand for M 
increases with their income. In maximizing utility, consumers must first choose mj to minimize 
the cost of attaining a given level of M before choosing their consumption of A and M to 
maximize utility subject to their budget constraint. Assuming income is measured in terms of A, 
the budget constrain is the following in region i: 
(2)  YYAMGi -=+  
where Gi is a price index for M goods in region i and the right hand term is discretionary or 
supernumerary income. The upper tier maximization problem yields 
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Combining these results with the lower tier preference maximization yields uncompensated 
consumer demand functions for each variety, mj, of M as6 
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Increasing returns to scale production in the M sector requires both a marginal (c) and a 
fixed (F) level of a single input. That is, the production of output q requires F + cq units of the 
input. Following FKV (1999, chapter 14), the production technology is defined indirectly in 
terms of a price index of production. The single input is a Cobb-Douglas composite of labor and 
intermediate goods with a as the share of intermediate goods in the input. Thus the price of this 
composite input is wi1-aGia, where wi is the wage rate in region i. Assuming intermediate goods 
                                               
5 While 㰰 is defined as an elasticity of substitution between varieties, it ultimately dictates the economies of scale at 
equilibrium (see Krugman 1991, Neary 2001).  
6 This is a standard CES demand function derivation. For details on the derivation in the context of this model see 
FKV (1999, p.46-8). 
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are aggregated according to a CES function with the same elasticity of substitution (㰰) as in the 
consumers’ lower tier utility function in equation (1), the price index is defined as  
(5)  [ ] )1/(11221111 )( sss --- += TpnpnG  
where ni represents the range of varieties in region i and price indices in region 2 are defined 
analogously. If firms set their output price, p, taking the price indices as given, then 㰰 is the 
perceived elasticity of demand and the profit maximizing pricing rule is 
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Choosing units such that c=(a-1)/a —implying that the marginal input required by the 
production technology equals the price-cost markup—ensures that firms in region 1 set their 
output price according to 
(7)   aa 1
1
11 Gwp
-=  
As a result of increasing returns to scale, consumers’ preference for variety, and the 
unlimited potential varieties of manufacturing goods, each variety is produced in only one 
location by a single firm. The number of varieties available is thus precisely the number of firms 
in operation, and the number of varieties, n, is determined at equilibrium by the exit and entry 
decisions by profit maximizing M firms. With intermediate goods as a factor of production a firm 
benefits from locating closer to other producers since other firms are potentially both 'consumers' 
of the firm's production (forward linkages) and suppliers of an input to the firm's production 
process (backward linkages).    
Assuming both regions have the same labor endowment, which is normalized such that 
total labor in each region is unity, production technology in the A sector is described by the 
strictly concave function (as in FKV 1999, chapter 14): 
(8)  
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where 㮰i is the share of labor in region i devoted to the M sector, K is a constant normalized such 
that it represents the total stock of a fixed production input (e.g., land) and 㭰 is the share of labor 
in A.  
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Total expenditures on M in region 1, E1, comes from (i) final consumers who devote 
share 㯀 of their discretionary income to purchasing M and (ii) other firms using intermediate 
goods as a factor of production. At equilibrium in the M sector, assume firms sell quantity q*.  
Because firms have zero-profits at equilibrium, total costs at q* equals the total value of 
production, n1p1q*, and a share a of total production costs pays for intermediate M goods. Thus,  
(9)  *)( 1111 qpnYYE am +-=  
where the first and second terms on the left are consumer and intermediate good expenditures, 
respectively. Since 㮰1 is the share of labor in sector M of region 1 and (1-a) is the share of labor 
in the composite input, the manufacturing wage bill is defined as, 
(10)  *)1( 1111 qpnw al -=  
Following FKV (1999), when units are chosen such that q*=1/(1-a) this simplifies to 
(11)  1
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Since labor allocation, 㮰i, and wages, wi—rather than the number of firms, ni, and prices, pi—are 
of primary interest, the price index equation in (3) can now be rewritten in 㮰 and w terms alone. 
Specifically, substituting equations (7) and (11) into the price index equation in (3) yields the 
following price index for region 1 
(12)  [ ] )1/(112)1(1221)1(1111 )()( saasasasas ll -------- += TGwGwG  
with the price index of region 2 derived analogously.  
 Given the demand function in (4) and q* as defined above, the manufacturing wage in 
region 1 that is consistent with zero profits by firms in region 1 is defined implicitly by7 
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where, combining equations (9) and (10) 
(14)   
a
la
m
-
+-=
1
)( 1111
wYYE  
Lastly, consumers’ income in region 1 is composed of both agricultural and manufacturing 
income. Agriculture production is given in equation (8). Since A is taken as the numeraire, 
agricultural income in region 1 is simply total agricultural production in the region. Total 
                                               
7 Details and discussion of the derivation of this wage equation are found in FKV (1999, p.49-53). 
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manufacturing income is the product of wages earned and the size of the labor force in the M 
sector, 㮰1.  
(15)   )1( 1111 ll -+= AwY  
The price index, wage, income, and expenditure equations derived above and presented 
in (12)-(15) describe the short-term equilibrium of the model. The short-term equilibrium 
consists of wages and prices in regions 1 and 2 (i.e., w1, w2, G1, G2). In the long-term, sector labor 
shares in each region adjust to intersectoral wage gaps, 㭀i, where  
(16)  )1( iii Aw ld -¢-º  
for i=1,2. The adjustment dynamic proposed by FKV (1999) and discussed more generally by 
Baldwin et al. (2003, p.16) implies that within each region, labor moves to the sector with 
highest wage offering. That is, labor in region i moves to M (A) when 㭀i is positive (negative). 
Thus, a long-term equilibrium consists of wages, prices and sector labor shares in regions 1 and 
2, where these variables jointly satisfy equations (12)-(15) and the following sector labor share 
conditions 
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 Endogenous technical change can be added to the CPVL model presented thus far in a 
simple and straightforward manner. Puga and Venables (1996) and FKV (1999, chapter 15) 
introduce an exogenous growth process by simply assuming “that technical progress steadily 
augments all primary factors” (FKV, 1999, p.264) and that technical progress is symmetric 
across both regions and sectors. Primary factors (labor) are then measured in efficiency units. 
Thus when labor share 㮰i is devoted to manufacturing in region i, the number of efficiency units 
in manufacturing in region i is L㮰i, where L denotes the efficiency level. Equilibrium wage rates, 
wi, in this augmented model now represent the wage per efficiency unit of labor. The empirical 
analog to L is total factor (labor) productivity, an index measuring efficiency relative to a base 
year.8 Puga and Venables (1996) and FKV (1999) conclude that forward and backward linkages 
in the presence of technical progress can generate “dramatic developmental spurts” (p.277). How 
sensitive is the spread of industry to technology equality across regions? Might endogenous 
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technology inequalities in the presence of vertically-linked forward and backward linkages yield 
a different pattern of development? 
 To endogenize technical progress with minimal modification to the CPVL model, let the 
efficiency level of region 1 be specified as follows 
(18)  
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where the function l1 maps the M labor shares of regions 1 and 2 measured as percentages9 into a 
factor (labor) productivity growth rate, also measured as a percentage. L2 is specified 
analogously. This form has the convenient property that the parameters 㮀 and 㱠 (㮀 ³ 㱠) are 
elasticities and therefore readily interpreted. 㮀 is the elasticity of the growth rate with respect to 
domestic industry size, where industry size can be construed in terms of the labor share or the 
number of M firms at equilibrium given the relationship in (11). 㱠 is the elasticity of the growth 
rate with respect to foreign industry size and captures spillovers between regions. Thus 㱠>0 
implies non-local spillovers. The growth rate is assumed to be inelastic to changes in industry 
size, whether domestic or foreign. Since spillover scope hinges on the relative size of 㮀 and 㱠, it 
is convenient to define 㱐 as the ratio of the growth rate elasticity of foreign industry size to that 
of domestic industry size  
(19)  
q
f
u º  
where by assumption 㱐Î[0, 1] and 㱐=1 implies global spillovers.  
 Allowing for endogenous technical progress as proposed in equation (18), the four sets of 
equations—price indices, wage, expenditure and income equations—are fully specified as 
follows 
(20)  [ ] )1/(112)1(12221)1(11111 )TGwL()GwL(G s-a-as-a-s-as-a-s- l+l=        
                                                                                                                                                       
8 This very simple introduction of a growth process into the model simplifies interpretation, but has the disadvantage 
of being amenable to various alternative interpretations. For example, because growth is assumed in this formulation 
to enter only by augmenting labor, an alternative interpretation is that L measures population growth.  
9 Sector labor shares are measured in percentage terms to insure that 0>
¶
¶
q
il  and 0>
¶
¶
f
il  
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IV. Analysis of Endogenous Growth, Spillovers and Trade Costs 
Before delving into the analysis of the CPVL model with endogenous technical progress, it is 
helpful to describe intuitively the forces at play. Since location choices are central to the CPVL 
model, the key forces are those that promote agglomeration and those that promote dispersion. 
Endogenous growth, as it has been specified in previous models, is an agglomeration force 
(Baldwin and Forslid 2000, Martin and Ottaviano 2001). Similarly, endogenous technical 
progress as specified in equation (18) exerts agglomeration pressure by rewarding industrializing 
regions with higher factor productivity. That is, when a worker in region 1 switches from A to M 
employment, she raises the productivity of both A and M workers, offering clear incentives for 
concentration of manufacturing activity.  
 An additional agglomeration force arises from the linear expenditure system formulation 
of consumer preferences. As L1 increases, whether it is exogenous or endogenous, so too does 
household income (equation (23)). Given the subsistence requirement, Y >0, the share of total 
income devoted to manufactured goods expands relative to the share of agricultural goods, which 
as in 1(b) of Table 1 drives up manufacturing wages. This agglomeration force associated with 
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increases in L makes possible the spread of industry highlighted in Puga and Venables (1996) 
and FKV (1999, chapter 15).10  
Agglomeration and dispersion forces can be further understood by considering the effects 
of increasing the manufacturing labor share in region 1, 㮰1, on the wage gap in that region, 㭀1 
(FKV, 1999, p.245). Table 1 summarizes the agglomeration and dispersion forces at play in the 
standard CPVL model and compares these forces to those of models with exogenous technical 
progress and with the endogenous technical progress specified in the previous section. 
Agglomeration forces are amplified when technical progress, whether exogenous or endogenous, 
is added. When technical progress is endogenous and spillovers are non-local, however, 
backward linkages in region 1 are further strengthened by the spillover connection to region 2. 
Demand for region 1 intermediate goods increases as 㮰1 increases because both E1 and E2 in 
equation (21) increase as a result (see equation (22)). This drives up wages in region 1. The 
dispersion force due to product market competition is doubly amplified with endogenous 
technical progress for a similar reason. The dispersion force due to a fall in the marginal product 
of labor in A, however, is diminished with endogenous technical progress since labor 
productivity in A increases with 㮰1.  
  To understand the structure of the equilibria of the model, FKV (1999, chapter 14) 
suggest graphing each region’s equilibrium wage in 㮰1-㮰2 space. While FKV use this graphical 
tool to show the effects of trade costs, in this model it also illustrates the effects of the growth 
rate elasticities, 㮀 and 㱠, on equilbria. Figure 1 contains four panels with these wage curves as a 
function of manufacturing labor shares, where effective units of labor in agriculture are denoted 
by ℓi=(1-㮰i)Li.11 Since the effect of T is not the primary focus here, T is set at 2.2 in all four 
panels.  
 As in FKV, the wage curves in Figure 1 show the levels of 㮰1 and 㮰2 at which wages are 
equalized between sectors in each region. To the rights of the w1=A’(ℓ1) curve wages are higher 
                                               
10 For this reason, the increasing share of manufacturing expenditure is the “driving force” in the exogenous 
technical progress model (FKV, 1999, p.265). As FKV show (1999), the spread of industry under perfect technology 
equality, proceeds in three steps: (i) the manufacturing concentration in country 1 leads initially to relatively high 
country 1 wages, (ii) the imposed linear expenditure system form causes the demand for manufactures to increase 
relatively rapidly as wages increase, thus reinforcing the advantages of agglomeration in country 1, (iii) ultimately, 
however, the wage gap between countries 1 and 2 becomes unsustainable and manufacturing firms begin migrating 
to country 2 in order to benefit from lower labor costs.   
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in A than in M (i.e., w1<A’(ℓ1)) and labor is assumed to move from M and to A; to the left, 
w1>A’(ℓ1) and labor moves from A to M. The horizontal arrows in each panel depict these 
dynamics. The w2=A’(ℓ2) curve is defined analogously except it is oriented to the vertical axis. 
The vertical arrows therefore describe the intra-sectoral labor dynamics in region 2. In each 
panel in Figure 1, there are two sets of wage curves. The first set drawn with thin lines 
corresponds to 㮀=0, 㱠=0, which approximates the standard CPVL model.  This set of wage 
curves shows the single, symmetric equilibrium 㮰1=㮰2≈0.4 and is included in each panel to 
provide a benchmark. The second set of curves corresponds to the values of 㮀 and 㱠 indicated in 
the panel subtitles. As shown in panels (a) and (b), increasing 㮀 while 㱠=0 pushes the (still) 
symmetric equilibrium away from the origin, making the wage curves increasingly concave to 
the origin. Generally, this effect is due to the additional labor productivity advantage conferred 
by higher manufacturing labor shares. The introduction of endogenous productivity growth, even 
if both sectors enjoy higher labor productivity, causes manufacturing wages, w1, to increase 
faster than the marginal product of agricultural labor, A’(ℓ1).  
The symmetric equilibrium of the benchmark case, 㮀=0, 㱠=0, is below and to the left of the 
equilibrium when 㮀>0, implying that w1>A’(ℓ1) at the benchmark equilibrium and that w1 
increased faster than A’(ℓ1). This is due to the strictly concave agricultural production function. 
Panels (c) and (d) show that increasing 㱐 primarily affects the tails of the wage curves, 
suggesting that the relative contribution of foreign industry size to domestic growth is greatest 
when industry size disparities are greatest. This effect arises from the constant elasticity 
specification of the productivity growth function and from the assumption that the elasticity of 
productivity growth with respect to foreign industry size is less than unity.  
 Graphing the wage gap for one region, so called ‘wiggle diagrams,’ is an alternative and 
common depiction of the equilibria of the model. Wiggle diagrams are shown in Figure 2 for 
T=1.6 (same parameter values as Figure 1). The vertical axis in these diagrams is the wage gap 
in region 1; the horizontal axis is manufacturing labor share in region 1. Given the assumptions 
on the movement of workers between sectors, a positive wage gap causes workers to move into 
the M sector and a negative one causes workers to move out of the M sector. A stable 
equilibrium, represented with filled dots, obtains whenever (i) the wage gap curve intersects the 
                                                                                                                                                       
11 Parameter values for these figures are Y =0.5, 㯀=0.8, a=0.4, 㰰=6.  Parameter values in the agriculture production 
function are as in FVK (1999, chapter 14, 15), namely, 㭰=0.95, K=1.  
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zero line with a negative slope or (ii) the wage gap curve intersects the vertical axis below the 
zero line (i.e., corner solution, 㮰1=0). An unstable equilibrium, represented with hollow dots, 
obtains whenever the wage gap curve intersects the zero line with a positive slope since the 
movement of one worker into the M sector increases the wage gap and entices more workers into 
the sector. In these panels, as before, the benchmark case (㮀=0, 㱐=0) is drawn with thin lines.   
 Consider panel (a) in Figure 2. Relative to the benchmark of 㮀=0, 㱐=0, introducing 㮀=0.5 
affects the wiggle diagram in two ways. First, it shifts the stable symmetric equilibrium to the 
right such that the equilibrium level of 㮰1 increases. This is expected as explained above for 
Figure 1. Second, it causes the wiggle diagram to rotate counterclockwise around the new stable 
symmetric equilibrium. This rotation suggests that introducing endogenous technical progress 
into the CPVL model causes the wage gap to shrink for all levels of 㮰1. As 㱐 increases, the stable 
equilibrium shifts yet further right as explained with Figure 1 above. Increasing 㱐 also changes 
the shape of the wiggle diagram in a way that counteracts the counterclockwise rotation due to 
㮀>0, suggesting that spillovers causes wage gaps to widen for all levels of 㮰1.  
From panel (b) of Figure 2, it is clear that increasing 㮀 further to 0.9 amplifies these 
effects. Indeed, the shrinkage in the wage gap when 㱐=0 (as shown by the counterclockwise 
rotation) is now so pronounced that multiple equilibria obtain. The core-periphery equilibrium, 
which failed to emerge when 㮀=0.5, now obtains for sufficiently low levels of 㱐. This logical 
result implies that when the productivity gains to an expansion in manufacturing labor are high, 
but spillovers are only local, one region can easily get left behind.  There are also two unstable 
asymmetric equilibria when 㱐=0. The effect of increasing 㱐 is similar to panel (a), but amplified 
dramatically since 㱠 is increasing in both 㮀 and 㱐. When spillovers are global (㱐=1), the wage 
gap explodes at low levels of 㮰1 and the equilibrium labor share approaches 㯀=0.8. At 
intermediate levels of spillovers, the core-periphery equilibrium becomes unstable, then non-
existent.     
 Figure 3 also shows wiggle diagrams, this time calculated at low trade costs (T=1.1). First 
note that at relatively low trade costs the core-periphery equilibrium obtains for the benchmark 
case, as well as for most values of 㱐 and 㮀. Only when 㮀=0.9 and 㱐>>0.65 does the CP 
equilibrium fail to obtain. At low trade costs, the periphery region only industrializes if spillovers 
are significantly global. Importantly, whereas increasing 㱐 when trade costs are relatively high 
shifts eqilibria to the right (Figure 2), increasing 㱐 when trade costs are relatively low shifts them 
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to the left. Broader spillovers lead to smaller equilibrium industry size in both regions when trade 
costs are low and linkages are consequently weak. The reverse is true when trade costs are high. 
This asymmetric effect of trade costs on the CPVL model with endogenous technical progress 
can be explored further using the common sustain-break analysis (see Puga and Venables 1996, 
FKV 1999, Baldwin et al. 2003).  
 Assume that manufacturing is initially concentrated in region 1 (i.e., l1>0 and l2=0). As 
in FKV (1999), relative manufacturing wages in regions 1 and 2 can then be derived from the 
price index and wage equations (equations (20) and (21)) as 
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This initial concentration of manufacturing in region 1 can be sustained as long as w2 < A’(L2)  
such that there is no incentive for workers to move to M. Since w2 = A’((1-㮰1)L1), the ‘sustain 
condition’ given equation (24) becomes     
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As discussed in FKV (1999, chapter 15), one can solve for endogenous variables w1 and l1 in L1, 
L2 and E1, E2  by using the fact that when manufacturing is concentrated in region 1 production in 
region 1 must meet total demand for manufactures, which generates the following equations:   
(26)  [ ]YLALALw 2))1(()()1( 112111 --+=- lmml       
(27)  ))1((' 111 LAw l-=           
 Departing from FKV (1999), where T and L are the parameters of interest, this paper 
focuses on the growth rate elasticities 㮀 and 㱐. For what levels of 㮀 and 㱐 is the concentration of 
manufacturing in region 1 sustainable? To answer this question, the sustain points and a sustain 
curve (S) implied by equation (25) can be mapped in 㮀-㱐 space. The other set of critical points, 
composing ‘break’ curves (B), indicate parameter levels at which the symmetric equilibrium is 
broken and an asymmetric one obtains. The panels in Figure 4 show sustain and break curves in 
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㮀-㱐 space for varying levels of trade costs.12 Panel (a) shows S and B curves for relatively high 
trade costs. Panel (b) shows these curves for relatively low trade costs. Suppose trade costs are 
initially high and steadily fall over time, as commonly assumed in the new economic geography. 
When T=1.6, the concentration in region 1 is only sustainable for high levels of 㮀 and low levels 
of 㱐. As concentration breaks, so too does all asymmetry between regions. Thus the symmetric 
equilibrium obtains for all remaining values of 㮀 and 㱐, and the S curve and the B curve are 
identical. As T falls, the sustain region grows. T=1.365 represents a tipping point at which the S 
and B curves split. As T falls further to 1.3, the concentration in region 1 is only broken with 
high levels of both 㮀 and 㱐. Over the range depicted in panel (a), therefore, falling trade costs 
make an initial concentration more sustainable. At intermediate trade costs (TÎ[1.2, 1.3]), the 
periphery is able to industrialize only if the domestic growth rate elasticity is high and spillovers 
are nearly global. In contrast, panel (b) shows that as trade costs continue to fall the S and B 
curves shift from the northeast to the northwest corner with T=1.1 as the analogous tipping point. 
When trade costs become relatively low, an initial concentration is only sustainable when the 
domestic growth rate elasticity is high and spillovers are nearly local.  As in the classic CPVL 
model, one with endogenous technical progress hinges importantly—and nonlinearly—on trade 
costs. These results confirm the intuitive finding that endogenous growth is destabilizing and 
spillovers are stabilizing—or agglomeration and dispersion forces, respectively (Baldwin and 
Forslid 2000).  
 One objective of this paper is to assess the joint effect of vertical linkages, as affected by 
trade costs, and endogenous growth with spillovers on economic development, yet the analysis 
thus far has treated trade costs and spillovers independently. To understand this joint effect, 
consider the development implications of the interaction of T and 㱐. This interaction is 
empirically relevant since the costs of ‘trade in ideas,’ which affect spillover scope, are typically 
correlated with trade costs, both of which fall with integration (see Baldwin and Forslid 2000 for 
an application of this logic to a core-periphery model). To capture economic development, I use 
real wages for regions 1 and 2, denoted 㲐1 and 㲐2, respectively, where 
                                               
12 Given the functional form of A(×), equation (26) does not have a closed form solution for l1. Likewise, equation 
(25), which is used to produce a graph of the sustain points in T-L space, cannot be solved for T. The system can 
therefore only be solved by numerical simulation. The author thanks Anthony Venables for his helpful assistance on 
these numerical solutions. 
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and 㲐2 is defined analogously.13 Real wages thus defined are measured in terms of agricultural 
production and are per efficiency unit. The ratio of real wages, 㲐2/ 㲐1, then measures the degree 
of economic equality between regions. An increase in this ratio is evidence of economic 
development in—or ‘spread of industry’ to—region 2.  
 To capture the interaction effect of 㱐 and T when the model is solved numerically 
requires three dimensional graphs. Figure 5 shows a graph of the ratio of real wages (i.e., real 
wage inequality) in 㱐-T space where 㮀=0.5.14 Noteworthy are the three regions on this real wage 
inequality surface. First, equality obtains either (i) when trade costs are very high (T>1.40) or 
very low (T<1.05) or (ii) when trade costs are high or low and spillovers are high. The former 
suggests that equality is inevitable for sufficiently high or low trade costs, a well-established 
feature of the CPVL model (see FKV 1999, chapter 14 and 15, Puga and Venables 1996). 
Second, there is a discontinuous and precipitous fall in the real wage ratio for marginal changes 
in T and decreases in 㱐. The rim defined by the intersection of the first and second regions 
represents precisely the ‘break’ curve in 㱐-T space since real wage equality necessitates 
manufacturing symmetry. Third, there is a continuous, slightly convex bottom surface suggesting 
that at intermediate levels of trade costs and spillovers inequality is increasing in T, but 
decreasing in 㱐. Cross-sections of this figure provide a clearer picture of the interaction of 㱐 and 
T.  
 Consider first a horizontal cross-section of Figure 5. The ‘break’ curve, defined by the 
rim in Figure 5, is such a cross-section, but is discontinuous in 㱐 over the range [0,1]. A 
continuous curve exists when 㲐2/ 㲐1=0.85 and is shown in Figure 6. Under the iso-inequality 
curve, 㲐2/ 㲐1<0.85. Outside the curve, 㲐2/ 㲐1>0.85. As trade costs fall the marginal rate of 
                                               
13 To understand the derivation of these real wages, assume first that consumers had Cobb-Douglas utility functions, 
instead of linear expenditure utility, and that there is no technical progress. Provided the production technology still 
required intermediate goods, real wages would be calculated simply as 㲐1=w1G1-㯀, where G1 adjusts for the price 
level of manufactured goods and 㯀 represents the expenditure share of manufactures from the Cobb-Douglas utility 
function. Adding technical efficiency parameter and a linear expenditure system parameter,Y , is then 
straightforward. Thus, the term in brackets represents nominal expenditure above subsistence requirements. This is 
adjusted by the price ratio, which is weighted by the expenditure share of manufactures, 㯀, and then added to the 
amount of agricultural product required for subsistence.  
 
14 The general shape of Figure 5 is independent of 㮀, but the slope of the bottom surface in this figure does become 
steeper as 㮀 increases. 
 21 
 
substitution between 㱐 and T is first increasing, then decreasing in absolute value and negative.15 
The shape of this curve, like that of the break curve, is due to the non-linear effect of trade costs 
in the CPVL model.  
Falling trade costs are initially an agglomeration force (when trade is economically 
feasible but backwards and forwards linkages are still strong), but eventually become a 
dispersion force (when backwards and forwards linkages fade away). Spillovers, contrastingly, 
are always a dispersion force. Once trade costs are low enough as to exert a dispersion force 
(T<1.25 in Figure 6), are falling trade costs and increasing spillovers dispersion substitutes or 
complements? The T cross-sections shown in Figure 7 address this question. Consider the slope 
of these real wage ratio cross-sections at 㱐=0.5. The slope of these curves, which captures the 
effect of spillovers on the real wage ratio at the given level of T, is non-negative for all values of 
㱐 since spillovers are always a dispersion force. As T falls from 1.25 the slope at 㱐=0.5 remains 
roughly constant initially. Then, at T=1.10, it increases sharply. Once T=1.05, equality obtains 
regardless of 㱐 and the slope is therefore zero. This suggests that falling trade costs and 
increasing spillovers are initially independent, then suddenly become strongly complementary 
dispersion forces once trade costs fall below some ‘tipping point.’ 
 
V. Conclusion 
There are three primary conclusions from the analysis of this paper. First, multiple equilibria or 
additional equilibria may obtain when endogenous growth with spillovers is introduced to the 
core-periphery vertically-linked (CPVL) model. Second, while endogenous technical progress is 
generally an agglomeration forced and spillovers are a dispersion force, the strength of these 
forces, both relative to each other and to the backward and forward linkages of the model, is 
dictated by trade costs. Third, the dispersion forces associated with increasing spillovers and 
relatively low, falling trade costs in the CPVL model mostly operate independently. However, 
there are critical values of trade costs at which the two are strong ‘dispersion complements’ such 
that a marginal increase in spillover scope significantly reduces the economic inequality between 
the two regions. The existence of such ‘tipping points’ suggests that some countries attempting 
to increase technology spillovers into its economy may enjoy few development benefits while 
others may reap substantial gains.  
                                               
15 Marginal rates of substitution are defined as the negative of the slope of an iso- curves.  
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There are several possibilities for future research along the lines of this analysis. One 
possibility for future research is extending the model to include multiple countries and multiple 
sectors. Another possibility is to extend the simpler economic geography models proposed by 
Baldwin, et al. (2003), which have analytic solutions, in a similar manner. Studying the 
interaction of multiple location forces when analytic solutions are in hand would be clearer and 
more insightful.  
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Figure 1 Manufacturing labor shares and wage curves, T = 2.2 
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Figure 2 Wage gap between sectors M and A in region 1, T=1.6 
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Figure 3 Wage gap between sectors M and A in region 1, T=1.1 
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Figure 4 “Sustain” (S) and “Break” (B) curves in 㮀-㱐 space  
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Figure 5 Real wage inequality in 㱐-T space (㮀=0.5)  
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Figure 6 Iso-inequality curves in 㱐-T space for 㲐2/㲐1=0.85 (㮀=0.5)  
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Figure 7 Real wage inequality cross-sections in 㱐-space (㮀=0.5)  
 31 
 
 
 
 Standard CPVL Model, 
No technical progress 
(L1=L2=1) 
Exogenous 
technical 
progress 
(L1=L2=L>1) 
Endogenous 
technical progress  
(L1=L1(㮰1,㮰2)>0, 
L2=L2(㮰1,㮰2)>0) 
1. Agglomeration Forces 
(tending to increase 㭀1) 
 
   
  (a) Forward linkage 
 
As 㮰1 increases, there is a reduction in 
the cost of intermediate goods and 
therefore in G1, which tends to increase 
equilibrium wages in the short-term as 
seen in the G1 term on the left side of 
the wage equation in (21). 
Amplified Amplified 
  (b) Backward linkage As 㮰1 increases, expenditures on 
manufactures, E1, increases (equation 
(22)), which shifts up firms’ demand 
curves for intermediate goods and 
drives up manufacturing wages as seen 
in the E1 term on the right side of 
equation (21).  
 
Amplified Amplified: 
Whenever spillovers 
are non-local (㱐>0), 
L2 increases with 㮰1, 
which increases E2 
and drives w1 yet 
higher. 
2. Dispersion Forces 
(tending to decrease 㭀1) 
 
   
  (a) MPL in A With the strictly concave agricultural 
production function specified in (8), an 
increase in 㮰1, and the corresponding 
decrease in agricultural labor, increases 
the marginal product of labor in 
agriculture. 
 
Amplified Diminished: As 㮰1 
increases, 
productivity and 
wages in both sectors 
increase. 
  (b) Product market 
competition 
As 㮰1 increases, so too does the supply 
of varieties, which reduces G1, shifts 
the firms’ demand curves downward, 
and drives manufacturing wages 
downward as seen in the G1 term on the 
right side of equation (21).  
 
Amplified Amplified: 
Whenever spillovers 
are non-local (㱐>0), 
L2 increases with 㮰1, 
which reduces G2 and 
drives w1 yet lower.  
Table 1 Summary of agglomeration and dispersion forces   
